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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
Building Bigness: Reputation, Prominence, and Social
Capital in Rural South India
Eleanor A. Power and Elspeth Ready
ABSTRACT Anthropologists have long been concernedwith how reputations help people gain the support of others.
Here, we study the support ties among adult residents of two Tamil villages, asking how reputational standing in
each village mediates access to social support. We find that a reputation for influence has the weakest effect on
support ties with others, while a reputation for generosity has the strongest. Further, a reputation for influence is
not associated with greater connections to people of “high position” outside the village. Given the weak effects
of a reputation for influence, we turn to a network measure of social capital, weighted PageRank centrality. While
persons who are recognized as influential often also have an influential network position, there are many others
who have similarly high centrality—including, notably, many women. Consequently, we suggest that much of the
anthropological evidence for the benefits of prominence may actually reflect the returns to greater social capital and
that both may be shaped in large part by acts of generosity and mutual support. By studying social capital, we can
achieve a more complete accounting of the many different social strategies employed by all persons, not simply the
few who achieve prominence. [reputation, social capital, network analysis, prominence, India]
RESUMEN Los antropo´logos han estado preocupados por largo tiempo acerca de co´mo las reputaciones ayudan
a las personas a ganar el apoyo de otros. Aquı´, estudiamos los lazos de apoyo entre los residentes adultos de
dos comunidades Tamil, preguntando como la posicio´n en te´rminos de reputacio´n en cada comunidad media el
acceso al apoyo social. Hallamos que una reputacio´n por influencia tiene el efecto ma´s de´bil en lazos de apoyo con
otros, mientras una reputacio´n por generosidad tiene el ma´s fuerte. Adema´s, una reputacio´n por influencia no esta´
asociada conmayores conexiones a personas de “alta posicio´n” por fuera de la comunidad. Dados los efectos de´biles
de una reputacio´n por influencia, recurrimos a unamedida de red de capital social, la centralidad ponderada del Page
Rank. Mientras personas quienes son reconocidas como influyentes tambie´n tienen una posicio´n de red influyente,
hay muchas otras quienes tienen similarmente centralidad alta —incluyendo, notablemente, muchas mujeres—.
Consecuentemente, sugerimos que mucha de la evidencia antropolo´gica sobre los beneficios de la prominencia
puede reflejar actualmente los beneficios de un mayor capital social, y que ambos pueden ser estructurados en gran
parte por actos de generosidad y apoyo mutuo. Al estudiar el capital social, podemos lograr una enumeracio´n ma´s
completa de las diferentes estrategias sociales empleadas por todas las personas, no simplemente las pocas que
logran prominencia. [reputacio´n, capital social, ana´lisis de red, prominencia, India]
I n the summer of 2013, Arulprakaash1 and Selvi cele-brated their daughter’s first communion. While some of
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their friends had very simple celebrations for their children’s
first communions, Arulprakaash and Selvi went for a more
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elaborate affair. They arranged for a special service at the
village church with the local priest. Posters and a speaker
set loudly announced the event, and more than seven hun-
dred people were invited. Well liked and well regarded,
Arulprakaash and Selvi received so many guests that they
had to erect a special canopy to provide shade for those who
could not fit into their house. A relative stationed at the
entrance received the small gifts of money (a few hundred
rupees, or five to ten dollars) called moy brought by the
guests. Literally, moy means a swarm or throng, and this
happened doubly, as people crowded around the relative,
and as themoney piled up, filling an entire suitcase. Themoy
from their daughter’s first communionwould not only cover
the expenses of the function itself but also let them repaint
their house and put down a new tiled floor. Arulprakaash
was well aware that it was only through the help of others
that they were able to do this:
For me, the house finishing has been accomplished. This is hap-
piness. Okay, at first, there was a house but not one in good
condition. Now, you’ve seen the house. Now the house is good.
From now on, with the salary I get, I won’t be able to do any
more. I was able to do this because of the function. I got the loan
and I repaid the loan. All paid completely. Separate, I cannot do
this.
If Arulprakaash had been “separate,”without the support
of others, his house would still be a weatherworn soot gray.
In fact, without support, his house would not exist; it had
been constructed years earlier with the moy collected at his
wedding.
In this article, we ask how Arulprakaash and Selvi man-
age to get such support. Using social network analysis, we
model the flows of support between people in two South
Indian villages, focusing on the role that a person’s reputa-
tion plays in his/her relations with others. We compare the
importance of a person’s reputation for generosity and good
character, on the one hand, with their reputations for giving
good advice and for wielding influence and authority, on the
other. We see the former as capturing local conceptions of
personal morality and virtue and the latter as capturing an
assessment of a person’s prominence. We find that having a
reputation for influence has a limited effect on getting help
from others, both within and beyond the village. Instead, it
is a reputation for generosity that has the strongest associa-
tion with accessing support. This correlation is partially due
to the strong effects of reciprocity and shared connections:
those with reputations for generosity are more likely to be
asked for help and so aremore likely to get it. Further, a rep-
utation for generosity is more closely associated with having
an influential network position, as measured by weighted
PageRank centrality, than a reputation for influence. In this
setting, influence and authority are almost exclusively at-
tributed to men, and often men of particular castes and
wealth. Yet we find that there are many people beyond this
narrow category of persons who, while not recognized as
influential, actually are influential in terms of their network
position. This observation, coupled with the stronger effect
of generosity on access to social support, leads us to argue
for a wider analytical and theoretical frame, moving beyond
a focus on the influence and prestige of a few patrons, lead-
ers, and “big men” to a broader focus on social capital. Such
a perspective better allows us to interrogate how people
for whom prominence is less accessible—especially women
and, in this setting, people of particular castes—may nev-
ertheless be able to build the “bigness” (perumai) that allows
them to gain the support of others.
With these findings, we speak to two distinct fields:
South Asian studies and evolutionary anthropology. These
seemingly disparate fields have both suggested that a good
reputation can be consequential for people’s livelihoods, and
both have been concerned with how people’s relationships
with others are implicated in those reputations. Both sub-
fields build from the fundamental observation that people’s
relationships and exchanges with one another help shape
their standing in society (Bourdieu 1986; Mauss 1954) but
perhaps inevitably diverge from there, both in terms of
the particular questions asked and in the types of evidence
brought to bear on those questions. In South Asian studies,
and cultural anthropology more broadly, the recent turn to
study the ethical has highlighted how interpersonal relations
become a site of moral tension and self-cultivation (Keane
2016; Laidlaw 2014; Pandian and Ali 2010; Robbins 2013).
In evolutionary anthropology, there is an increasing interest
in exploring the nuances of how people assess others and
build relationships with them (Barclay 2013; Bliege Bird and
Power 2015; Bliege Bird, Ready, and Power 2018; Lyle
and Smith 2014; Macfarlan, Quinlan, and Remiker 2013).
We find both to be compelling, if partial, accounts of the
ways in which people maneuver within their social worlds.
Here, we attempt to offer a rich account of that maneu-
vering by combining ethnographic observation with social
network analysis, a methodological framework that allows
for quantitative analysis while fundamentally recognizing the
embeddednature of the social person.Our approachnot only
leads us to reaffirm some core anthropological insights (for
example, the importance of reciprocity) but also helps us
note new complexities, especially those that operate at the
interstices between personal interactions and structural out-
comes. This approach also allows us to capture the broader
landscape of social strategies employed by persons of very
different social and economic positions within the villages,
including both men and women, as they attempt to achieve
their goals. Having surveyed that landscape, we see generos-
ity as a common driver of both prominence and social capital
across all segments of the population. This leads us to argue
that both evolutionary anthropology and South Asian studies
would benefit from extending their focus from prominence
to the more inclusive concept of social capital.
REPUTATION, PROMINENCE, SOCIAL SUPPORT,
AND THE SOUTH ASIAN PERSON
In South Asian studies, it has long been recognized that the
flows of support between persons are not only materially
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important but also socially and morally meaningful. Indeed,
foundationalworks have stressed how the SouthAsian person
is fundamentally understood through interpersonal relation-
ships and group identities, so much so that some contend
that there is no individual in South Asia but only the “di-
vidual” (Marriott 1976). In this conception, the person is
not firmly distinct and bounded but rather is composed of
biomoral substances that can be absorbed, dispersed, and
combined as persons interact, fundamentally changing their
being in the process (Daniel 1984). Ethnographies of South
Asia, and South India in particular, have evocatively illus-
trated the ways in which people work to shape their porous
selves (Daniel 1984; Pandian 2009; Prasad 2007) and have
further shown how such work on the self involves the care-
ful negotiation of one’s intimate relationships (Busby 2000;
Trawick 1992;Venkatesan 2014). This body of ethnographic
work, though, does not suggest that there is no individual
but instead shows how South Asians navigate the ambiguities
and tensions between individual autonomy and the collec-
tive. As M. Mines (1994) argues, for example, Tamil per-
sons can be understood as “contextualized individuals,” read
through the groups and identities to which they hold. He
illustrates this most compellingly through his portraits of
“big men” (periyavarkal., influential local leaders) in Chennai
who are able to wield influence through their positions of
prominence within caste organizations, temple committees,
charitable organizations, and other institutions. Such “big
men” are marked by their relationships with others, partic-
ularly their patronage and the assistance they render to their
constituents.
What M. Mines’s (1994; see also M. Mines and
Gourishankar 1990) work on “big men” (who are, almost
always, men) shows is that a person’s relationships shape
not only how he is understood (and how he understands
himself) but also how he can work to distinguish himself.
The patronage of institutional “big men” expresses a selfless
commitment to the group at the same time as it serves to
elevate the patron above those followers, establishing the
relative difference between them through the flow of giving
(Piliavsky 2014). Accounts of such leaders suggest that this
is often done strategically, with aspirant leaders working
to position themselves as particular representatives of and
arbiters between groups (Alm 2010). Earlier works on in-
tercaste relations and ritual prestations by Marriott (1976)
and Raheja (1988) also emphasize how relationships can
be used strategically, showing how castes employ different
strategies of transaction with other castes in an effort to
assert and secure relative standing and power. Here, too,
people’s relations are sites of negotiation and can establish
undifferentiated intimacy as well as difference.
Prominence and interpersonal relations, then, are fun-
damentally entwined, each facilitating and shaping the other.
This holds not only for “big men” but for all persons, as “a
Tamil’s success in life vitally depends on maintaining good
relationships and a good reputation within one’s commu-
nity” (M. Mines 1994, 31). A person’s ability to call upon
the assistance of others is determined in part by how he or
she is viewed. If a person is spoken of well by others and has
a good “name” (peyar), he or she may accrue a good reputa-
tion (perumai), and so find others open to helping him/her.
Still, while everyone may be concerned with maintaining a
good name, it is primarily men who are afforded distinctions
and given authority. Consequently, thework on prominence
and patronage in South Asia has largely been a study of men’s
efforts at individuating themselves, despite the fact that the
benefits of having a “good name” and of being a “big person”
are understood to be consequential for all.
A very different body of research helps us understand
just how consequential prominence and a “good name” can
be. Evolutionary anthropologists have long been interested
in understanding people’s pursuit of cultural success (Irons
1979), documenting the benefits that result from being a
person of prominence. For example, a number of studies
have found that people who are known as good hunters have
higher fertility and more surviving offspring (Smith 2004),
and a similar pattern holds cross-culturally for high-status
persons (Von Rueden and Jaeggi 2016). Multiple mecha-
nisms have been suggested as mediators of this empirical
pattern (Von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2011), a number
of which suggest that high-status persons will have greater
access to better marriage partners and better collaborative
partners.Dominant persons (those able towield power)may
be able to coerce others to act in their interest, whereas pres-
tigious persons (those with valued knowledge and expertise)
may be able to attract others interested in learning from and
associating with them (Henrich, Chudek, and Boyd 2015;
Henrich and Gil-White 2001). Like the work on South Asia,
nearly all of this work has focused on men and male pursuit
of status, dominance, and prestige.
Being known as generous may also have productive so-
cial consequences. In particular, reputations for generosity,
based on past interactions with others, can help maintain
cooperation through indirect reciprocity: such reputations
can help cooperative persons identify others like them and
avoid those who might behave selfishly (Nowak and Sig-
mund 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). There is good
empirical evidence of the social returns to generosity and
prosociality, such as increased help during illness (Gurven
et al. 2000), more generous cooperative partners (Bliege
Bird and Power 2015), and a greater ability to mobilize
others for collective action projects (Lyle and Smith 2014;
Macfarlan, Remiker, andQuinlan 2012). These findings sug-
gest that people seek to improve their reputation and their
prominence because of the many benefits that may accrue
from being well known and well regarded, including being
sought out as a partner, being able to access a broader range
of resources and support, and being able to influence others.
To these bodies of work, we add the tool of social
network analysis. In so doing, we heed an early call by
Srinivas and Be´teille (1964) for South Asianists to take up a
network perspective. We view this paper as a demonstra-
tion of the potential of this tool for exploring some of the
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fundamental questions that are shared across the diverse sub-
fields of anthropology. Our social network approach takes
the contention that the self is constituted through relation-
ships as a point of departure, constructing a network to
explicitly represent that entanglement. We do this not by
studying idealized roles or transactions between represen-
tatives of different castes and communities (e.g., Marriott
1968, 1976) but instead by studying the broader multidi-
mensional relationships between persons as relayed by the
persons themselves. With this network approach, then, we
maintain the tension between the individual and the dividual,
simultaneously recognizing both. This approach also gives a
more comprehensive and nuanced rendering of the socioe-
cological conditions from which particular persons pursue
different behavioral strategies. It allows us to look not solely
at the strategies of the select few persons who find them-
selves in positions of prominence but instead at the efforts of
all persons, whatever their particular set of constraints and
possibilities.
Ultimately, we use these analyses to argue for a more
expansive view of people’s efforts at social maneuvering
and suggest that the concept of social capital may be par-
ticularly helpful in this effort. Our study suggests that the
common thread of people’s strategies—across economic,
gender, caste, and class distinctions—is not the constant
pursuit of prominence but rather a striving for interpersonal
connections. Our findings show that generosity and reci-
procity occupy a more important place in people’s interper-
sonal relationships than prominence and that prominence is
valuable to the extent that it facilitates those relationships.
These are arguments that we see as being fundamentally
facilitated by the network approach taken here. Our ability
to view the aggregate outcome of dyadic interactions allows
us to show how intimate relationships and the generous acts
that help define them are crucially formative of people’s
social standing, and so of their social possibilities.
SETTING AND DATA
“Al
¯
aka¯puram” and “Ten
¯
pat.t.i” are located in the dry scrub-
lands in the center of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Fed
sporadically by the irrigation waters flowing from the Vaigai
River, the fields surrounding the villages support crops of
rice and cotton for a few months each year. During the
rest of the year, most villagers engage in wage labor, tak-
ing construction jobs, cutting wood, or participating in
the government’s “100 Days Work” scheme. Increasingly,
younger residents are shifting from agriculture and day la-
bor to skilled and semiskilled work, finding employment
in factories, shops, and offices, whether in nearby towns
and cities or abroad. Each village has roughly two hun-
dred households with a mix of different religious (Hindu,
Catholic, and Protestant) and caste communities (primarily
Ya¯tavar, Akamut.aiya¯r, Pal.l.ar, and Par¯
aiyar castes). The caste
composition of the two villages differs (see SI Table S1 for
more details of the demographics),2 with the Pal.l.ar caste
being numerically preponderant in Al
¯
aka¯puram, and so in
many ways dominant within the village despite historical and
contemporary marginalization as a Scheduled Caste.
Reliance on other people is an inevitable part of
life in Al
¯
aka¯puram and Ten
¯
pat.t.i. People learn of work
opportunities through their peers. They rely on neighbors
and relatives to watch their children so they can take that
work. They eat at each other’s houses when they do not
have a hot meal at home. They borrow money from friends
and relatives to cover their children’s school fees. In all of
these ways, the residents of these villages are linked by flows
of material and immaterial aid. Much aid flows, too, from
nongovernmental organizations and from the Indian state,
with subsidies providing residents with many basic essentials
and various schemes offering work opportunities, training
courses, microfinance loans, and childcare. Residents are
also often reliant on friends and family living in nearby towns
and cities, as well as further afield. With young villagers en-
gaging in migrant labor to countries in the Persian Gulf and
Southeast Asia, these networks, and in many ways the vil-
lages themselves, extend far beyond their physical confines
(Osella and Osella 2012; Velayutham and Wise 2005).
The first author undertook ethnographic fieldwork in
these villages, residing there for twenty months between
October 2011 andAugust 2013. In addition to extensive par-
ticipant observation and open-ended, in-depth interviews,
this work included a formal survey conducted toward the
end of that fieldwork (in February and April of 2013) with
782 of the 809 (97 percent) adult residents. The survey had
two parts: a social support survey and a reputation survey.
First, in the social support survey, respondents were
asked to name those personswho provided themwith twelve
different types of support (see SI Figure S1), covering mate-
rial aid (lending household items, giving a loan), behavioral
assistance (running errands, babysitting), emotional support
(conversation partners, close friends), guidance (giving ad-
vice, discussing important matters), and vouched support
(help finding work, aid during a conflict, help navigating
bureaucracy by someone of a “high position”). The particu-
lar questions and types of support elicited were determined
through extensive discussions and pretesting with local in-
terlocutors. Respondents could name as many people as
they liked for each of the twelve questions. On average,
respondents named a total of seventeen people and named
some of those persons as providing themwith multiple types
of support, leading to an average of thirty nominations by
each respondent. In total, the villagers reported 23,089 ties,
64 percent of which were with other residents of the vil-
lages. With these ties, we construct networks representing
the supportive relationships among villagers, as shown in
Figure 1 (for more details, see Power 2017b; see also SI
Table S7 for summary statistics of the networks).
Second, in the reputation survey, respondents were
asked to name those persons whom they felt had eight par-
ticular qualities (for more details, see Power 2017a), of
which four are studied here (see SI Figure S2): (1) hav-
ing a generous attitude (ta¯ra¯l.a man¯
appa¯n
¯
mai ut.aiya napar),
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 1. The social support networks of (a) Al
¯
aka¯puram (N = 420) and (b) Ten
¯
pat.t.i (N = 362). Nodes (persons) are colored by caste membership
and sized by their reputation for generosity. Edges are directed, with arrows pointing to the person to whom requests for support are directed; thicker edges
reflect requests for more types of support. The position of each node is determined by the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm. [This figure appears in color in
the online issue]
(2) having good character (nalla kun. am pat.aittavar), (3) giv-
ing good advice to anyone who asked (ya¯rit.am nalla a¯lo¯can¯
ai
ke¯t.t.u per¯
ala¯m), and (4) having influence (celva¯kku, literally a
“voice that spreads”) and authority (atika¯ram pat.aittavarkal.).
We consider all four as measures of “reputational quality”
because they result from peer assessments. While the repu-
tational qualities are related (see SI Table S5 for the partial
correlations), both local understandings and principal com-
ponent analyses (see SI Table S6 and Figure S3) suggest
that they fall into two distinct domains: reputations for gen-
erosity (i.e., being generous or having good character) and
reputations for prominence (i.e., giving good advice and
wielding influence and authority). We further distinguish
between different aspects of prominence, following distinc-
tions in evolutionary theory (Cheng et al. 2013), as well as in
Tamil understandings of the moral conception and valuation
of a person (M. Mines 1994; P. Price 2006). In particular,
we consider being known for giving good advice to be a
measure of prominence comparable to concepts of prestige
and being known for wielding influence and authority to be
a measure of prominence closest in local meaning to ideas
about dominance.
For each of the four questions, respondents typically
named two or three villagers. The resulting number of nom-
inations each resident received gives a sense of that person’s
relative standing for each reputational quality. These mea-
sures are quite skewed, with many people being named only
once or twice (248; 32 percent) across all qualities or not at
all (101; 13 percent), and a few people being nominated by
many residents. To ameliorate this skew, we log transform
the count of nominations and scale it to range from 0 to 1
for each reputational quality (see SI Table S4 for summary
statistics).
Additional background data come from a household cen-
sus conducted by the first author. The data from this census
cover a broad range of demographic, economic, and social
variables, including gender and age, educational attainment,
religious denomination and caste membership, household
wealth, kinship relations among villagers, and the physical
distance between households. These variables are expected
to influence the probability of a relationship between per-
sons, and so they are included in the analyses.
ANALYSES
Guided by both theoretical and local understandings of repu-
tation,we expect a strong relationship between howaperson
is perceived by his/her peers and his/her relationships with
them, with those persons who are most well regarded being
best able to call upon others for support. This should hold
both for those who are seen as generous and also for those
who are seen as prominent. To evaluate this, we draw on
records of residents’ reputations and of their supportive re-
lationships, assessing how the former relates to the latter.
We do this by looking at the support network within the
village and at connections to people beyond the village.
Within the Village
We investigate the extent to which reputations for gen-
erosity and reputations for prominence play both direct and
indirect roles in supportive relationships within the village
using exponential random graph models (ERGMs). ERGMs
model the probability of a tie between each pair of nodes
(here, persons) in a network, in a manner analogous to lo-
gistic regression, while also allowing for the inclusion of
structurally dependent terms, such as reciprocity and tran-
sitivity, in addition to individual- and dyad-level attributes
(Robins et al. 2007; Snijders et al. 2006). We conduct the
analyses in R (R Core Team 2016) using the statnet suite of
packages (Handcock et al. 2008).3 Throughout the analysis
and results, we refer to two hypothetical women (“Uma”
and “Mutthu”) for clarity in describing the model terms (see
Figure 2).
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FIGURE 2. Figurative description of the main model terms.
TABLE 1. Exponential random graph model results, showing the effect size of different reputational qualities, reciprocity, and shared partners on the
probability of a support tie. These are separate models for each reputational quality in each village. Note that as reputational qualities are scaled from 0
to 1, the coefficients for those terms represent the maximum effect. Full model results in SI Tables S9 and S10.
Generous Good char. Good advice Influential
Al
¯
aka¯puram
Indirect eff., supp. given 1.67*** 1.53*** 1.20*** 1.18***
Indirect eff., supp. received −1.97*** −1.82*** −1.77*** −1.79***
Direct eff., supp. given 2.49*** 2.15*** 2.45*** 1.58***
Direct eff., supp. received 0.62*** 0.71*** 0.29* −0.57**
Reciprocity 1.67*** 1.58*** 1.69*** 1.73***
Shared Partners 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.79***
Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Indirect eff., supp. given 1.15*** 1.04*** 0.94*** 0.84***
Indirect eff., supp. received −1.10*** −0.92*** −1.05*** −1.11***
Direct eff., supp. given 2.61*** 2.30*** 2.09*** 1.32***
Direct eff., supp. received 0.64*** 0.34* 0.54*** 0.08
Reciprocity 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.28***
Shared Partners 0.96*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.98***
***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05
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We construct four ERGMs for each of the villages,
differentiated by the reputational quality considered (gen-
erosity, good character, giving good advice, or influence). In
examining the effect of the reputational qualities on support
ties, we consider four model terms: (1) “indirect effect, sup-
port given,” which is the effect of a person’s reputation on
the probability that others name him/her as providing them
with support; (2) “indirect effect, support received,” which
is the effect of a person’s reputation on his/her probability of
naming others as providing him/herwith support; (3) “direct
effect, support given,” which models the effect of a person
being named as providing support, given that the receiver
nominates the provider for that reputational quality (Uma
helps Mutthu, and Mutthu nominates Uma); and (4) “direct
effect, support received,” which models the probability of
a person being named as providing support, given that the
provider nominates the receiver for that reputational quality
(Mutthu helps Uma, and Mutthu nominates Uma). The first
two “indirect” terms represent how a person’s overall rep-
utation relates to his/her ability to give or receive support,
and the latter two “direct” terms represent how a particular
person’s evaluation of another relates to the support they
give to each other (see SI Table S2 for further description of
all model covariates and SI Table S3 for summary statistics
of those covariates).
The effect of support given on support received is
modeled with a term for reciprocity, which accounts for
the increased probability of a support tie in one direction
when a support tie already exists in the other (Uma helps
Mutthu, andMutthu helps Uma).We also include a term for
transitivity (using geometrically weighted edgewise shared
partnerships; Hunter and Handcock 2006), which measures
the increased probability of a tie between persons who
have shared partners (Uma and Mutthu have a supportive
relationship, and they both have a relationship with Latha).
Each model includes terms for the effect of a person’s age,
gender, and wealth on the probability of a supportive tie, as
well as for the tendency for people to affiliate with others
of the same gender and education level, and with those who
are kin and neighbors. Finally, we include two terms for
caste: a term for the general effect of a person’s caste on the
probability of a supportive relationship and a term for caste
homophily (the effect of two people being of the same caste).
The full ERG models are presented in SI Tables S9 and
S10. Table 1 summarizes the effects of the four different
reputational qualities for each village along with the effects
of reciprocity and shared partners. Figure 3 demonstrates
the effect of each reputational quality on the probability of
being named as providing support, for both the indirect and
direct measures of reputation as well as other forms of social
affiliation, using the probability of a tie between two forty-
two-year-old women of the Pal.l.ar caste as an example. Each
panel in Figure 3 shows the changing probability of requests
for support as the supporter’s reputation increases along
with the effect of different combinations of other model
terms, such as reciprocity and having a shared partner.
The results show that all reputational qualities have
similarly small indirect effects on the overall probability of
being asked for support, with the odds of a tie increasing
only very slightly with greater reputational standing (Fig-
ures 3a and b, panel 1). However, as the increasing slopes
show in each subsequent panel, greater reputational standing
has a more pronounced effect when combined with other
terms.
When we examine the direct effect of reputational
standing on incoming requests for support, the effects begin
to differentiate across the reputational qualities. Increas-
ing reputation for generosity has the largest effect on the
probability of a request for support, while influence has
a comparatively small effect on the probability of incom-
ing requests for support (Figures 3a and b, panel 2). That
is, if Uma believes Mutthu is generous, she is more likely
to ask Mutthu for support than if she believes Mutthu is
influential.
Other forms of social connection also have a sizable
effect on the probability of a support tie, across all models.
Having even just one common partner substantially increases
the probability of a supportive relationship (Figures 3a and
b, panel 3). Even stronger is the effect of reciprocity: if Uma
provides support to Mutthu, Mutthu is generally (averaging
between the models) 5.3 times as likely to provide support
to Uma in Al
¯
aka¯puram and 3.5 times as likely in Ten
¯
pat.t.i
(Figures 3a and b, panel 4) than if she did not.
Turning to the effect of reputation on receiving support,
we find that the indirect effect of reputation is negative for
all reputational qualities and, in most cases, is more negative
than the indirect effect of reputation on giving support is
positive. That is, persons with greater reputational standing
experience, on average, a slight increase in requests for
support but are actually less likely than persons of lower
reputational standing to ask others for support (SI Figure
S4).
The direct effect of reputation on receiving support is
generally small and positive across models, meaning that
when Uma nominates Mutthu as having some reputational
quality,Uma is alsomore likely to provide support toMutthu
(Figures 3a and b, panel 5). There is one key exception:
nominating someone as influential has no effect on whether
the nominator provides that personwith support inTen
¯
pat.t.i,
but it actually decreases the probability that the nominatorwill
provide him/her with support in Al
¯
aka¯puram.
Across the different reputational qualities, the results
consistently show that a reputation for generosity has the
strongest effect on the probability of incoming requests for
support, while a reputation for being influential has the
weakest effect. For support received, although in both cases
the probability of receiving support decreases as reputa-
tion increases (SI Figure S4), persons with a reputation for
generosity still have a much higher probability of receiving
support than those with a reputation for being influential.
Further, supporting others substantially increases the proba-
bility that a person will receive support, thanks to the strong
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(a)
(b)
FIGURE 3. Summary of the effect of the four different reputational qualities and social proximity on the probability of a supportive relationship in each
village as the reputation of the person giving support increases. The reputation of the person requesting support is held constant here at 0.1, and we use
forty-two-year-old women of the Pal.l.ar caste to illustrate the effect of other variables. Each panel shows the effect of a person’s increasing reputational
standing on the probability of others requesting support of her, starting with just the indirect effect of reputational standing and progressively adding
further dimensions to the relationship between the giver and requester, such that in addition to the variables considered in the panels to the left, in Panel
2 the requester also nominates the giver as having the reputational quality, in Panel 3 the giver and requester also have a shared partner, in Panel 4 the
requester also provides support to the giver (so, a reciprocal relationship), and in Panel 5 the giver also nominates the requester as having the reputational
quality. See SI Table S12 for further description of the particular change statistics used to calculate the predictions. [This figure appears in color in the
online issue]
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FIGURE 4. Summary of posterior distributions of parameters in the binomial regressions modeling people’s ties to persons of “high position” outside of
each village, with 65 percent and 95 percent probability intervals.
positive effect of reciprocity. These results hold when we
consider multiple types of reputation within a single model:
for both villages, when influence and generosity are included
in the same model, the effects of generosity remain similar
to the single-reputation model, but the effects of influence
generally become smaller (SI Table S11).
Beyond the Village
While having a reputation as influential may have a rela-
tively small or even negative effect on accessing support
within the village, influential persons may instead be more
oriented to others beyond the confines of the village. Many
have suggested that “big men” are considered as such because
of their privileged access to powerful people beyond their
constituents to whom they can connect (e.g., Alm 2010;
Srinivas and Be´teille 1964). So, we now examine whether
people who have a reputation for influence are more likely
to have connections to people of “high position” (said in
English, or as uyarntu pataviyil ul.l.avarkal.) beyond the vil-
lage, where a person of “high position” is someone who is
either reported as being such by respondents or is reported
as having a position that is locally considered to be so (e.g.,
government employee, police officer, doctor, lawyer). On
average, people reported having ties to two people of “high
position” outside the village (SI Table S8). We model the
proportion of support ties that each person haswith “high po-
sition” alters outside the villages using a binomial regression
with individual random effects and measures of education,
age, gender, caste, and wealth in addition to the person’s
reputation for wielding influence and authority. We run the
models using the rethinking package (McElreath 2017) in
R; numeric variables in the models have been centered and
rescaled, except for the reputational variable, which is scaled
between 0 and 1.
We find that a reputation for influence has only a min-
imal effect on the likelihood of connections to people of
“high position” outside the villages (see Figure 4 and SI
Table S13). Those persons who are seen as having influence
and authority within the village do not seem to have priv-
ileged access to people of “high position” outside it. The
strongest effect is instead seen for education, with those
who are more educated than most villagers being much
more likely to report connections to “high-position” people
outside the village.
DISCUSSION
We find that reputation alone does little to influence a per-
son’s supportive relations both within and beyond the vil-
lage. Regardless of the reputational quality, the indirect
effect of reputation on giving support is positive but slight,
and its effect on receiving support is generally larger and
negative. The direct effect of reputation is, not surprisingly,
much stronger and positive. It is really with greater social
proximity—where persons have shared support partners,
reciprocal relationships, or mutual recognition that each is
reputable—that reputation begins to more substantively in-
fluence a person’s ability to give and receive support (as seen
in panels 3 to 5 of Figures 3a and b).
It is important to consider how a person’s reputation
for generosity and reputation for prominence differentially
impact his/her ability to give and receive support. Themod-
els indicate that incoming requests for help increase more
quickly with reputation than outgoing requests. In other
words, more reputable people have a greater number of
people asking them for support, and they are less likely to
ask for support themselves. Yet the strong effect of reci-
procity in all of the models means that reputable persons
do ask for support from those whom they help. High-
reputation persons are also more likely to ask for support
from those who consider them reputable (for character,
generosity, and advice, though importantly not for influ-
ence). Thus, the benefit of a reputation may stem not from
a person’s enhanced ability to ask unconnected others for
support but rather from the fact that others who view that
person as reputable may approach him/her for help. The
importance of reciprocity means that, when in need of assis-
tance, those of high reputational standing are able to draw
on the help of those who have already sought them out.
Consequently, even if they do not necessarily call upon a
greater number of people on a day-to-day basis, reputable
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persons may have a wider pool of potential helpers to draw
upon. Critically, though, this does not hold as strongly for
a reputation as being influential, suggesting that the co-
ercive power associated with dominant persons may not
generate these positive feedbacks of mutual recognition and
support.
These findings strongly echo ethnographicwork in South
India that has shown how close relationships are defined
by fluctuating flows of support and indebtedness (e.g.,
Appadurai 1985; Busby 2000; Daniel 1984; Trawick 1992).
The effect of reciprocity is not only empirically visible in
our models but is also highly valued in Tamil society. A rep-
utation is valuable because of how it is instantiated through
supportive social relationships, and it is a reputation for
generosity, rather than the more aggrandizing markers of
prominence, that we find is most closely associated with
both incoming and outgoing supportive ties. This suggests
that it is actually the more subtle aspects of interpersonal
relationships and mutual assistance that best help people
access support themselves. These findings suggest that at-
tempts to understand how people access resources through
social channels shouldmove from a focus on explicit markers
of status and prestige to a more comprehensive measure of
social capital.
From Prominence to Social Capital
The word that is often translated as “reputation” in Tamil is
perumai, though it is more accurately translated as “bigness”
or “greatness” (Bate 2009; D. Mines 2005). It implies a sort
of social and spatial expansion as a person’s renown grows.
At functions such as Arulprakaash and Selvi’s daughter’s
first communion, perumai is made particularly tangible; the
number of people in attendance, the amount of food served,
the number and size of gifts given by relatives, the distance
from which people traveled to attend, and the growing total
of the moy donations are all measures of perumai (D. Mines
2005).
We suggest that, more so than reputation, perumai
might be better understood as social capital, the potential
material and immaterial resources embedded within a per-
son’s social network (Bourdieu 1986; Lin 2001). This ismost
clearly illustrated in the large vinyl “flex-board” banners that
accompany such functions. The banners have studio pho-
tos of the honoree, often edited to add in new suits or extra
gold jewelry.Markers of caste and religion are also included,
with images of caste leaders or of movie stars from the same
caste. Most important for us here, the banners typically have
a second crowd of faces and names: the family and friends
of the protagonist(s). Alongside the photos of all of the sup-
porting characters are not only their names but also often
their degrees (BCom, DEEE), their jobs (Airtel, police), or
simply their locations (Dubai, Chennai). Many groups make
banners, so the entrance to a function hall is often flanked by
numerous banners with different constellations of support-
ing characters. Certainly, these banners include markers of
economic and cultural capital, but the “bigness” that is most
conspicuous is the visible manifestation of the social capital
of the honoree.
As with the English translation of perumai, the line be-
tween reputation, prominence, and social capital is often
blurred, making it easy to conflate them. Figure 5 shows
the close relationship between a network proxy of social
capital—weighted PageRank centrality—and a reputation
as influential or generous (see also SI Table S5). Weighted
PageRank is a measure of network centrality that reflects
the strength and number of incoming ties to each node
while alsomore heavily weighting ties from important nodes
(those that themselves have more incoming ties; Xing and
Ghorbani 2004). Compared to other measures of centrality
(such as simple degree or eigenvector centrality), weighted
PageRank captures a much more comprehensive set of in-
dicators of the importance of a person’s network position,
including the number of incoming and outgoing ties, the
strength of those ties, and whether those ties are to other
structurally important persons. For these reasons, we sug-
gest that, in this case,weightedPageRank calculated from the
social support network is a good proxy for social capital: it
simultaneously measures a person’s investment in social re-
lations and the quality of those relations. Broadly, weighted
PageRank and reputational standing for both generosity and
influence trend together, with those who are most widely
recognized as reputable also having higher weighted PageR-
ank centrality.
While the broad correspondence among generosity,
prominence, and social capital may lead us to see them
as proxies or reflections of one another, the discrepancies
between them should make us wary of doing so. Figure 5
also shows that there are many people who are not ex-
plicitly recognized as being influential but who nevertheless
occupy central, and potentially influential, network posi-
tions.Most arguments in evolutionary anthropology for why
people pursue prominence rest on how it can lead to bet-
ter access to desirable partners, strengthened relationships,
or greater influence over others (Cheng et al. 2013; Von
Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2011). However, here we
find that the returns to prominence are limited, both within
and beyond the village, and what benefits exist may be more
accurately understood as returns to helping others and in-
vesting in supportive relationships. Indeed, much of the lit-
erature on leadership and eminence in South Asia explicitly
describes leaders as wielding influence only insofar as they
are able to actually work as brokers for their constituents
and manage to get things done (Alm 2010; M. Mines and
Gourishankar1990; Piliavsky 2014). Instead of focusing on
prominence itself as facilitating influence and support, then,
it may actually be the prosocial acts of those persons that
drive the consistent finding of a relationship between promi-
nence and social and biological returns (Barclay and Willer
2007; M. Price 2003; Raihani and Barclay 2016; Willer
2009; see also McFarland et al. 2017; Silk et al. 2009). In
sum, our findings suggest that small, subtle acts of support
are what give prominence its potency.
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FIGURE 5. Scatterplots with LOESS curve (and shaded 95 percent confidence interval) showing the relationship between a person’s weighted PageRank
centrality in the social support network (rescaled to range from 0 to 1) and his/her reputation for (top) influence and (bottom) generosity for residents of
the two villages.
From “Big Men” to “Bigness”
We argue that the study of people’s attempts to improve
their livelihoods should focus not on efforts to become a
periyavar, a “big man,” but instead on the broader task of
building perumai, “bigness,” or social capital. By turning
to directly study the full range of actions that can build
a person’s social capital, rather than solely acts of aggran-
dizement, we can broaden our understanding of the social
foundations of people’s livelihoods in a number of impor-
tant ways. Most crucially, it will help counteract the narrow
focus on the small subset of people who aspire to or achieve
prominence.While a young girl having her first communion
may not be a “big person,” she still has some “bigness,” as
seen by the supporting characters on the banners announcing
the event. Social capital is not something limited to only a
select few.
Treating the study of “bigness” as the study only of “big
men” is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it pre-
sumes that only the pursuit of obvious eminence is the way
to achieve social success (Irons 1979). This excludes most
people and, with it, most strategies (Bowser and Patton
2010; Collier 1974). In Tamil Nadu, at least, prominence is
often seen as the purview of the wealthy (Dean 2013). Only
a person with “means” (vacati) can have prestige, leaving
the poor with “prestige problems” (kaurava piraccinai). Simi-
larly, “big people” are traditionally wealthy property holders
of the dominant caste in the village. Saravanan (a poorerDalit
man from Ten
¯
pat.t.i) put it succinctly: “Influence [celva¯kku]
is nothing but money.” Prominence is also almost exclu-
sively the domain of men in these villages. In Figure 6, we
break out the relationship betweennetwork social capital and
reputational standing by gender, showing that women are
rarely, if ever, recognized as being influential.
Second, the study only of “big men” hinders the recogni-
tion of changes over time. The traditional image of a few “big
men” working as privileged brokers to other regional leaders
and sources of power is not reflected in our analyses. This is
not to say that people of influence do not have these connec-
tions but rather that everyone does. While in the past, village
“big men” (coming from dominant, landholding castes) may
have wielded such authority, recent political, economic, and
social changes mean that they no longer have exclusive ac-
cess to those advantageous connections (cf. Gorringe 2010;
Philip 2017; P. Price 2006). As more people have been
able to own land, pursue higher education, get loans, enter
politics, secure salaried jobs, find work abroad, and so on,
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FIGURE 6. Plots as in Figure 5, additionally broken out by gender.
both the number of loci of power and the range of people
who have access to them have increased. Had we studied
only the few obvious “big men,” we might have seen their
connections to regional leaders as a source of their influence
and authority. Instead, we see that others are not depen-
dent on them as brokers, having instead multiple potential
avenues to social capital and influence, whether through
education (as our binomial regression suggests), opportuni-
ties abroad (Osella and Osella 2012), political connections
(Alm 2010), or local social connectedness (as our ERGMs
suggest).
Perhaps most importantly, the study only of “big men”
results in a misunderstanding of the strategies and pathways
to building “bigness.” It is likely because much of the work
on prominence has actually been a study ofmale prominence,
both in evolutionary anthropology (e.g., Casimir and Rao
1995; Gurven and Von Rueden 2006; Henrich, Chudek,
and Boyd 2015; Pe´russe 1993; Smith 2004; Von Rueden,
Gurven, and Kaplan 2008, 2011; Von Rueden and Jaeggi
2016) and in South Asian studies (e.g., M. Mines 1994;
Piliavsky 2014; P. Price and Ruud 2010) that the focus has
stayed solidly on how people work to build prominence
instead of on their efforts to build social capital. Our re-
sults show, though, that it is not prominence that is most
crucial in accessing the supportive relationships that are so
foundational to peoples’ livelihoods. This directs us, then,
to look at additional strategies and aims, ones that are more
grounded in peoples’ relationships, and ones that are ulti-
mately more widely employed.4 For example, while a repu-
tation for being influential is mostly limited to men in these
villages, an influential network position and a reputation as
generous are not similarly constrained. While women are
essentially not recognized explicitly as being influential, they
often are, in terms of their network centrality. Determining
how women, and all people, build social capital will ensure
that we have a fuller understanding of the different strategies
persons employ to get by.
Kausalya, a former resident of Ten
¯
pat.t.i, is one person
who clearly demonstrates the importance of social capital in
achieving “actual” influence. Villagers often seek her out for
help with their particular causes. When a few women de-
cided that their cluster of houses deserved its own bore well,
for example, they quickly recruitedKausalya to talk to a local
government official on their behalf. “She speaks well,” Selvi
explained. Kausalya later gave her own explanation, saying
that she is so often consulted because she is unique in knowing
how to navigate the systems of government (through peti-
tions, requests, strategically placedphone calls, etc.). She has
developed this skill, she said, thanks to her job at a govern-
ment office tasked with overseeing government-sponsored
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women’s self-help groups and to her close relationship with
her boss. A district-level government official, the boss holds
some authority, as well as the purse strings for some gov-
ernment funds, making Kausalya, with his assistance, un-
commonly successful in enrolling young Ten
¯
pat.t.i villagers
in free training programs, securing additional funding for
village facilities, and acquiring loans for forays into new
business endeavors. “Atu en
¯
n
¯
o¯t.u power,” she said, using the
English word: “That’s my power.” Kausalya uses her knowl-
edge of bureaucracy to advance the lives of her friends and
relations in the village. Such abilities make her one of the
few women who was ever mentioned as having any influ-
ence or voice (celva¯kku) in the reputation survey. Often,
that voice is quite literal: she is the only woman to reg-
ularly speak up in village meetings. Through her efforts
to help the village and its villagers, Kausalya has devel-
oped a reputation as generous and influential, to be sure.
Still, her “power” is not her reputation per se but her social
capital.
Kausalya, of course, remains an exception, especially
among women. While her social capital is indeed accom-
panied by a reputation for influence, the two often do not
trend together. In fact, the person with the highest weighted
PageRank centrality in Ten
¯
pat.t.i was nominated as being
influential exactly zero times (she is, however, nominated
as being generous eighteen times). This person is Selvi,
Arulprakaash’s wife. Unlike Kausalya, Selvi does not have
any personal knowledge of the workings of government pro-
grams. What Selvi does have is a calm, friendly demeanor
and an open space behind her home. Each evening, when
Selvi brings the dirty dishes from dinner out to the backyard
to wash them, the women from the neighboring homes roll
out reed mats and sit down to chat and gossip about the
day. Selvi also has a number of relatives, former neighbors,
and friends who are government officials, NGO employees,
teachers, and police living outside the village whom she can
call upon.While Selvi is not named and recognized by other
villagers as wielding influence and authority, according to
her position in the village support network, she is actually
one of the most influential people in the village. Her social
capital and the ways in which she fosters it are much more
in line with how most residents of Al
¯
aka¯puram and Ten
¯
pat.t.i
maneuver their social worlds.
As exemplified by Kausalya, Arulprakaash, and Selvi,
there are multiple pathways that can help a person build
social capital. Certainly among them is the pursuit of promi-
nence, but this appears to be of secondary importance; more
crucial may be the fostering of trusting, cooperative rela-
tionships. Opening your home to others, assisting with the
harvest, volunteering time to help prepare for the temple
festival, lending tools—all of these acts can potentially help
build one’s social capital. In addition to focusing on the set
of strategies employed by those persons aspiring to promi-
nence, we argue for a study of this wider suite of strategies,
as all are relevant to understanding how people are able to
gain support and influence others.
CONCLUSION
NeitherArulprakaash nor Selviwas recognized by their peers
as being a person of influence. Yet they were able to draw
hundreds of people together to celebrate their daughter and
to help them refinish their home. Their ability to call upon
others rests not on their prominence but on their reputation
for generosity and good character and on the actual sup-
port that they provide to others. Indeed, as Arulprakaash
said, their reasoning for having had such an elaborate func-
tion for their daughter’s first communion was, essentially,
reciprocity:
To get back the moy, the collection money, that we had given out
earlier. We had to get it back, you know. That’s why. We go and
give to all of our relations. To get back what we have given, it
can only be collected if we conduct this function. Otherwise, it’s
a waste. That’s why we had the function.
Arulprakaash and Selvi’s last function had been their
own wedding, more than ten years earlier. In the interven-
ing years, they had given out, in total, many thousands of
rupees as moy at other peoples’ functions. To their minds,
it was time to recoup some of that moy. Such relationships
of reciprocal support are, for Arulprakaash, what sustain
people:
We should help one another mutually. Only then would they
come and help us. Affection [pa¯cam] comes only by giving help.
If we do not help, there will not be affection. It’s like that only.
[EAP: What type of help do you mean?] Say suddenly now you
fall sick—they take you to the hospital . . . . Similarly, they help
us when we are needy, as the situation requires. As it comes.
Accordingly, we too. As there is an affection over them [mela oru
pa¯cam], they give to us. If not, they do not give, you know.
The people who provide help, Arulprakaash asserted,
are thosewithwhomone hasmutual, affectionate ties. These
relationships involve support and exchange across multiple
currencies and across long spans of time.What is to be striven
for in relationships is an intimacy that lets much be asked and
much be given. While at any one moment Arulprakaash and
Selvi may not need such support, their active assistance of
others (and their reputation for that generosity) means that,
when they are in need, they are well positioned to call upon
that reserve of support.
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1. The names of people and places have been changed to ensure
people’s anonymity. Throughout, we follow the University of
Madras Tamil Lexicon for Tamil diacritics.
2. The supporting information (“SI”) referred to throughout the text
can be found on Wiley’s website.
3. The R code for the analyses is available through GitHub at
https://github.com/eapower/BuildingBigness.
4. This recognition of different strategies mirrors the four types of
transactors put forth by Marriott (1976), who highlighted the
fact that persons (or caste groups) could use different patterns of
transactions with others to better their relative position. Rather
than arguing that we find evidence for any one particular type
of transactor (e.g., “maximal” or “optimal”), we instead make
the broader observation that there are many variegated strategies
employed, and that with tools such as social network analysis, we
may be better able to identify those varieties.
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Al
¯
aka¯puram Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Households Residents Adults Households Residents Adults
Caste (ja¯ti)
A¯ca¯ri 0 0 0 13 42 27
Akamut.aiya¯r 2 5 5 35 111 81
Aruntatiyar 4 11 6 7 17 14
Hindu Vel.l.a¯l.ar 1 4 4 1 3 1
Hindu Ya¯tavar 19 60 44 12 39 30
I¯l.avar 1 3 2 0 0 0
Ja¯n
¯
a¯n
¯
1 3 3 0 0 0
Kal.l.ar 0 0 0 6 19 13
Kula¯lar 11 51 32 2 7 5
Mar
¯
avar 11 42 25 0 0 0
Na¯t.a¯r 1 2 1 0 0 0
Na¯yakkar 0 0 0 1 4 3
Pal.l.ar 111 353 240 39 125 81
Pan. t.a¯ram 1 3 3 0 0 0
CSI Par
¯
aiyar 30 92 60 0 0 0
Pil.l.ama¯r 3 4 4 0 0 0
Catholic Vel.l.a¯l.ar 5 10 9 0 0 0
Catholic Ya¯tavar 0 0 0 48 168 116
Reservations
Scheduled Castes 145 456 306 46 142 95
Backward Castes 56 187 132 118 393 276
Religion
Hindu 166 533 361 116 367 255
Roman Catholic (RC) 5 10 9 48 168 116
Protestant (CSI) 30 92 60 0 0 0
Evangelical 0 8 8 0 0 0
Total 201 643 438 164 535 371
Table S1: The number of households (N = 365), residents (N = 1178), and adult residents (N
= 809) of Al
¯
aka¯puram and Ten
¯
pat.t.i broken down by caste and religious denomination. Note
that this is a full accounting of all residents of the villages, and so includes persons who did
not complete the social support survey. The Pal.l.ar caste is often also referred to as Te¯ve¯ntira
(Devendra), and three caste groups recorded as distinct here form a larger caste community:
the Akamut.aiya¯r, Kal.l.ar, and Mar¯
avar groups are collectively called Te¯var (also called the
Mukkulatto¯r).
1
Social Support Questions
In our life, each of us in different ways, depend on a variety of others for money, work, etc.  Now, we will 
ask questions for their names, to see how many people you are dependent on. Why do you depend on 
them? Whoever are the helpers for you, only you know.
        
, ...         
   ?    ?   
  .
1. If you want to talk about important matters, who do you talk with?
1.        ?
2. If you want daily work [implying daily wage labor] or a new job [implying more permanent employment], 
who do you approach?
2.          ?
3.Who will amicably help you with physical tasks [meaning, running errands and other chores]?
3.        ?
4. Who do you borrow household items from?
4.        ?
5. If you suddenly need a small amount of money for something, whom would you ask for it from?
5.      ?
6. If you need a lot of money, whom would you ask for it from [meaning, a loan]?
6.      ?
7. If you have to go to work and need someone to watch your child, who would you give them to?
7.         
?
8.If you had to spend a lot of time talking with someone, who would you like to talk with?
8.      ,     
?
9. If any problem happens, who are the people who will help you?
9.       ?
1. Who do \ou Nnow well in a high position >e.g., government ofÀcials, police, law\ers, teachers, etc.@
10.  ,    ?
11. Who are your very close friends or relatives?
11.       ?
12. Who are the people who give you advice?
12.     ?
Figure S1: The survey (in English and Tamil) used to elicit the support relationships.
2
Reputation Questions
The question we now ask, we want to know what your opinions about the people in this village and what 
your thoughts about them are.
   ,        
          
. 
14. In this village, who is the person with a generous disposition? 
14.       ?
15. In this village, who do you think gives good advice to anyone who asks? 
15.         ?
16. In this village, if some problem happens, who is the person to resolve it? Who has the influence and 
authority? 
16.         ?   /  
 ?
17. In this village, who is the person with good character?
17.      ?
Figure S2: The survey (in English and Tamil) used to elicit the reputational nominations
under study in this paper.
3
Variable Term type Description
Age Node covariate The individual’s age.
Caste Node factor The caste membership of the individual. This includes religious
denomination, so, e.g., Catholic and Hindu Ya¯tavars are distinct castes.
Gender Node in-factor The individual’s gender.
Household Wealth Node in-covariate Monetary value of the individual’s household’s property, in 1000
rupee (approximately $15) units. See Power (2017a). for details.
Gender Homophily Edge factor Whether two individuals have the same gender.
Close Kin Edge factor Whether two individuals are related as parent/child, siblings,
or spouses.
Caste Homophily Edge factor Whether two individuals are of the same caste.
Education Years Di↵erence Edge covariate The absolute di↵erence in the total number of years of education.
Distance between Households Edge covariate The distance (in 10 meter units) between individuals’ houses.
Indirect Reputation, Given Node in-factor The e↵ect of an individual’s reputation on giving support to others.
Indirect Reputation, Received Node out-factor The e↵ect of an individual’s reputation on getting support from others.
Direct Reputation, Given Edge factor The e↵ect of an individual’s reputational nomination on his/her
probability of requesting help from that nominee.
Direct Reputation, Received Edge factor The e↵ect of an individual’s reputational nomination on his/her
probability of providing help to that nominee.
Reciprocity Edge factor The e↵ect of a supportive tie in one direction on the probability of
a reciprocal tie.
Shared Partners Edge factor Geometrically-weighted edge-wise shared partners (GWESP).
Table S2: Description of the variables used in the exponential random graph models. Node
terms reflect the impact of a person’s (node’s) attributes on the probability of a support
tie (an edge). Edge terms capture the e↵ect of some relationship between every two set of
individuals (each dyad) on the probability of a tie (e.g., whether they are of the same gender or
the physical distance between their households). “In” refers to terms that a↵ect incoming ties
(meaning, people naming that person as providing them with support). Terms without the
“in” qualifier include e↵ects of the variable on both incoming (people naming that person) and
outgoing ties (that person naming others). Covariates are numeric predictors while factors
are categorical.
Variable N Mean ± SD Median Min Max # of Levels
Al
¯
aka¯puram
Age 420 42.03 ± 14.42 40 18 70  
Gender 420 243 F, 177 M       2
Caste 420         14
Household Wealth (in 1000 INR) 420 186.15 ± 80.16 174.50 10.00 672.00  
Years of Education 420 4.48 ± 4.91 3 0 15  
Household Distance (in meters) 131044 109.73 ± 56.76 105.17 0 317.47  
Close kin 131044 862 Yes, 175538 No       2
Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Age 362 42.82 ± 15.37 40 18 70  
Gender 362 201 F, 161 M       2
Caste 362         10
Household Wealth (in 1000 INR) 362 206.74 ±127.90 189.50 10.00 1059.00  
Years of Education 362 5.63 ± 5.01 5 0 15  
Household Distance (in meters) 176400 337.40 ± 268.08 279.32 0 1145.84  
Close kin 176400 798 Yes, 130246 No       2
Table S3: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models.
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Al
¯
aka¯puram Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Mean ± SD Median Min Max Mean ± SD Median Min Max
Raw
Has Generous Disposition 2.67 ± 6.18 1 0 86 1.82 ± 2.91 1 0 23
Has Good Character 2.85 ± 6.98 1 0 99 2.31 ± 3.54 1 0 31
Gives Good Advice 2.16 ± 7.79 1 0 111 1.69 ± 5.54 0 0 67
Has Influence & Authority 2.33 ± 14.19 0 0 201 1.68 ± 10.01 0 0 129
Weighted PageRank 0.003 ± 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.003 ± 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.014
Rescaled
Has Generous Disposition 0.20 ± 0.17 0.16 0 1 0.24 ± 0.22 0.22 0 1
Has Good Character 0.20 ± 0.17 0.15 0 1 0.25 ± 0.22 0.20 0 1
Gives Good Advice 0.13 ± 0.17 0.15 0 1 0.13 ± 0.18 0 0 1
Has Influence & Authority 0.07 ± 0.15 0 0 1 0.05 ± 0.15 0 0 1
Weighted PageRank 0.086 ± 0.105 0.055 0 1 0.172 ± 0.162 0.126 0 1
Table S4: Descriptive statistics of reputational nominations for the two villages. The rescaled
reputational variables are transformed as followed: log(x+ 1)/max(log(x+ 1)).
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Generous Character Advice Influential PageRank
Has Generous Disposition   0.664 0.645 0.573 0.714
Has Good Character 0.670   0.612 0.584 0.625
Gives Good Advice 0.574 0.594   0.761 0.656
Has Influence & Authority 0.463 0.492 0.743   0.644
Weighted PageRank 0.684 0.575 0.538 0.372  
Table S5: Partial correlations (showing Pearson’s r) between the rescaled reputation variables.
The values above the diagonal are from Al
¯
aka¯puram, below from Ten
¯
pat.t.i. Calculated in R
using the rcorr function.
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
Al
¯
aka¯puram
Has Generous Disposition 0.5230 -0.4306 -0.7228 -0.1367
Has Good Character 0.5166 -0.5241 0.6741 0.0635
Gives Good Advice 0.5204 0.5179 -0.0599 0.6763
Has Influence 0.4345 0.5213 0.1402 -0.7210
Proportion of Variance 0.7308 0.1247 0.0921 0.0525
Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Has Generous Disposition 0.5862 0.4659 -0.6601 -0.0606
Has Good Character 0.5981 0.2956 0.7437 -0.0423
Gives Good Advice 0.4402 -0.5840 -0.0834 0.6770
Has Influence 0.3239 -0.5954 -0.0654 -0.7323
Proportion of Variance 0.7079 0.1434 0.1057 0.0430
Table S6: Results of principal component analyses for the four reputational qualities in
Al
¯
aka¯puram and Ten
¯
pat.t.i (done separately, using the prcomp function in R), showing that
these four reputational qualities broadly map on to two latent variables, captured here by
distinctions drawn in the second principal component (PC2). The sign of the loading is
arbitrary.
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Figure S3: Plots of the first and second principal components for the principal component analyses
of the four reputational qualities in the two villages, as reported in Table S6.
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Al
¯
aka¯puram Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Full Adult Resident Full Adult Resident
Edges 7302 4024 5743 3065
Nodes 2455 420 2018 362
Mean Degree 5.946 19.162 5.692 16.934
Density 0.001 0.023 0.001 0.023
Reciprocity 0.175 0.318 0.187 0.351
Transitivity 0.121 0.193 0.109 0.178
Diameter 10 9 8 7
Average Path Length 4.304 3.515 4.137 3.399
# of Respondents with Out-Degree = 0 0 1 0 0
# of Respondents with In-Degree = 0 5 5 6 6
Table S7: Network summary statistics for each network under study.
Mean ± SD Median Min Max % of Alters (Mean ± SD)
Al
¯
aka¯puram 2.51 ± 2.35 2 0 16 14.17% ± 11.29%
Ten
¯
pat.t.i 2.38 ± 2.05 2 0 15 15.06% ± 11.96%
Table S8: Descriptive statistics of villagers’ ties to external alters of “high position.”
8
Generous Character Advice-Giving Influential
Edges  4.473⇤⇤⇤  4.668⇤⇤⇤  4.421⇤⇤⇤  4.418⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.072)
Age 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Gender (No = 0) 0.479⇤⇤⇤ 0.523⇤⇤⇤ 0.487⇤⇤⇤ 0.503⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Gender (Female = 0) 0.142⇤⇤⇤ 0.090⇤⇤⇤ 0.091⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Close Kin (No = 0) 1.610⇤⇤⇤ 1.572⇤⇤⇤ 1.626⇤⇤⇤ 1.646⇤⇤⇤
(0.078) (0.076) (0.073) (0.075)
Household Wealth (1000 INR units)  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education Years Di↵erence  0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.020⇤⇤⇤  0.019⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance Between Houses (10 m units)  0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Caste (No = 0) 1.075⇤⇤⇤ 1.057⇤⇤⇤ 1.077⇤⇤⇤ 1.087⇤⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049)
Caste: A¯ca¯ri [reference category]
Caste: Aruntatiyar 0.000 0.065  0.022  0.031
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082)
Caste: Hindu Vel.l.a¯l.ar  0.001 0.042  0.010 0.010
(0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.094)
Caste: Hindu Ya¯tavar  0.273⇤⇤⇤  0.191⇤⇤⇤  0.270⇤⇤⇤  0.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035)
Caste: I¯l.avar 0.048 0.167 0.090 0.060
(0.142) (0.145) (0.138) (0.140)
Caste: Ja¯n
¯
a¯n
¯
0.061 0.098 0.036 0.016
(0.136) (0.135) (0.125) (0.127)
Caste: Kula¯lar  0.236⇤⇤⇤  0.134⇤⇤⇤  0.247⇤⇤⇤  0.263⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Caste: Mar
¯
avar  0.111⇤  0.015  0.099⇤  0.136⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
Caste: Na¯t.a¯r 0.660
⇤⇤⇤ 0.690⇤⇤⇤ 0.608⇤⇤⇤ 0.607⇤⇤⇤
(0.129) (0.113) (0.126) (0.098)
Caste: Pal.l.ar  0.531⇤⇤⇤  0.457⇤⇤⇤  0.535⇤⇤⇤  0.572⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
Caste: Pan. t.a¯ram 0.129 0.213 0.241 0.262
(0.178) (0.166) (0.157) (0.152)
Caste: CSI Par
¯
aiyar  0.381⇤⇤⇤  0.291⇤⇤⇤  0.368⇤⇤⇤  0.384⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Caste: Pil.l.ama¯r  0.616⇤⇤  0.523⇤⇤  0.486⇤⇤  0.478⇤⇤
(0.193) (0.188) (0.186) (0.179)
Caste: RC Vel.l.a¯l.ar  0.109  0.015  0.015 0.049
(0.066) (0.057) (0.062) (0.052)
Reputation Terms
Indirect e↵ect, support given 1.671⇤⇤⇤ 1.532⇤⇤⇤ 1.203⇤⇤⇤ 1.184⇤⇤⇤
(0.083) (0.084) (0.082) (0.088)
Indirect e↵ect, support received  1.967⇤⇤⇤  1.819⇤⇤⇤  1.774⇤⇤⇤  1.791⇤⇤⇤
(0.093) (0.094) (0.096) (0.113)
Direct e↵ect, support given 2.494⇤⇤⇤ 2.148⇤⇤⇤ 2.453⇤⇤⇤ 1.575⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.075) (0.090) (0.098)
Direct e↵ect, support received 0.624⇤⇤⇤ 0.710⇤⇤⇤ 0.288⇤  0.568⇤⇤
(0.105) (0.103) (0.126) (0.175)
Structural Terms
Reciprocity 1.670⇤⇤⇤ 1.575⇤⇤⇤ 1.686⇤⇤⇤ 1.731⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.076) (0.073) (0.070)
Shared Partners (GWESP, ↵ = 0.6) 0.780⇤⇤⇤ 0.794⇤⇤⇤ 0.775⇤⇤⇤ 0.792⇤⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
AIC 25225.117 25626.912 25869.788 26472.826
BIC 25507.305 25909.099 26151.975 26755.013
Log Likelihood -12584.559 -12785.456 -12906.894 -13208.413
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table S9: Summary of ERG models for Al
¯
aka¯puram, for each reputational quality, showing
model coe cients with standard errors in parentheses.
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Generous Character Advice-Giving Influential
Edges  4.456⇤⇤⇤  4.465⇤⇤⇤  4.228⇤⇤⇤  4.270⇤⇤⇤
(0.098) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095)
Age  0.001  0.001⇤  0.003⇤⇤⇤  0.003⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Gender (No = 0) 0.649⇤⇤⇤ 0.671⇤⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Gender (Female = 0)  0.059⇤  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.085⇤⇤  0.045
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Close Kin (No = 0) 2.370⇤⇤⇤ 2.312⇤⇤⇤ 2.388⇤⇤⇤ 2.422⇤⇤⇤
(0.080) (0.084) (0.087) (0.082)
Household Wealth (1000 INR units) 0.000 0.000⇤⇤ 0.000⇤ 0.000⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education Years Di↵erence  0.041⇤⇤⇤  0.041⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance Between Houses (10 m units)  0.078⇤⇤⇤  0.077⇤⇤⇤  0.080⇤⇤⇤  0.080⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Same Caste (No = 0) 0.762⇤⇤⇤ 0.743⇤⇤⇤ 0.756⇤⇤⇤ 0.758⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034)
Caste: A¯ca¯ri [reference category]
Caste: Akamut.aiya¯r  0.093⇤⇤  0.090⇤⇤  0.083⇤⇤  0.085⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Caste: Aruntatiyar  0.046 0.019  0.005  0.005
(0.066) (0.061) (0.060) (0.055)
Caste: Hindu Vel.l.a¯l.ar 0.335
⇤ 0.408⇤⇤⇤ 0.392⇤⇤ 0.352⇤⇤
(0.133) (0.101) (0.121) (0.115)
Caste: Hindu Ya¯tavar 0.037 0.032 0.037 0.041
(0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036)
Caste: Kal.l.ar 0.135
⇤⇤ 0.106⇤ 0.128⇤⇤ 0.144⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049)
Caste: Kula¯lar  0.049  0.064  0.025 0.053
(0.091) (0.093) (0.085) (0.081)
Caste: Na¯yakkar 0.284 0.283 0.387⇤ 0.469⇤⇤
(0.170) (0.172) (0.154) (0.149)
Caste: Pal.l.ar  0.234⇤⇤⇤  0.236⇤⇤⇤  0.245⇤⇤⇤  0.249⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Caste: RC Ya¯tavar  0.229⇤⇤⇤  0.230⇤⇤⇤  0.220⇤⇤⇤  0.214⇤⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Reputation Terms
Indirect e↵ect, support given 1.147⇤⇤⇤ 1.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.936⇤⇤⇤ 0.838⇤⇤⇤
(0.077) (0.080) (0.089) (0.100)
Indirect e↵ect, support received  1.104⇤⇤⇤  0.918⇤⇤⇤  1.049⇤⇤⇤  1.113⇤⇤⇤
(0.087) (0.084) (0.105) (0.103)
Direct e↵ect, support given 2.612⇤⇤⇤ 2.304⇤⇤⇤ 2.085⇤⇤⇤ 1.316⇤⇤⇤
(0.104) (0.098) (0.114) (0.127)
Direct e↵ect, support received 0.643⇤⇤⇤ 0.337⇤ 0.540⇤⇤⇤ 0.079
(0.141) (0.131) (0.162) (0.052)
Structural Terms
Reciprocity 1.254⇤⇤⇤ 1.251⇤⇤⇤ 1.245⇤⇤⇤ 1.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.094) (0.089) (0.087)
Shared Partners (GWESP, ↵ = 0.5) 0.959⇤⇤⇤ 0.973⇤⇤⇤ 0.966⇤⇤⇤ 0.978⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
AIC 18780.217 19009.194 19263.543 19603.154
BIC 19014.950 19243.927 19498.276 19837.886
Log Likelihood -9366.109 -9480.597 -9607.772 -9777.577
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table S10: Summary of ERG models for Ten
¯
pat.t.i, for each reputational quality, showing
model coe cients with standard errors in parentheses.
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Al
¯
aka¯puram Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Edges  4.559⇤⇤⇤  4.455⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.104)
Covariates
Age 0.001  0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Same Gender (No = 0) 0.457⇤⇤⇤ 0.654⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.037)
Gender (Female = 0) 0.175⇤⇤⇤  0.060⇤
(0.026) (0.031)
Close Kin (No = 0) 1.580⇤⇤⇤ 2.363⇤⇤⇤
(0.073) (0.083)
Household Wealth (1000 INR units)  0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education Years Di↵erence  0.021⇤⇤⇤  0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004)
Distance Between Houses (10 m units)  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.078⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.004)
Same Caste (No = 0) 1.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.766⇤⇤⇤
(0.052) (0.038)
Caste: A¯ca¯ri [reference category]
Caste: Aruntatiyar  0.003  0.046
(0.083) (0.068)
Caste: Hindu Vel.l.a¯l.ar 0.017 0.350
⇤⇤
(0.096) (0.130)
Caste: Hindu Ya¯tavar  0.268⇤⇤⇤ 0.043
(0.038) (0.038)
Caste: Kula¯lar  0.240⇤⇤⇤  0.047
(0.036) (0.086)
Caste: Pal.l.ar  0.514⇤⇤⇤  0.235⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.031)
Caste: I¯l.avar 0.065
(0.141)
Caste: Ja¯n
¯
a¯n
¯
0.084
(0.129)
Caste: Mar
¯
avar  0.099⇤
(0.042)
Caste: Na¯t.a¯r 0.652
⇤⇤⇤
(0.103)
Caste: Pan. t.a¯ram 0.158
(0.161)
Caste: CSI Par
¯
aiyar  0.371⇤⇤⇤
(0.034)
Caste: Pil.l.ama¯r  0.625⇤⇤⇤
(0.187)
Caste: RC Vel.l.a¯l.ar  0.086
(0.060)
Caste: Akamut.aiya¯r  0.087⇤⇤
(0.033)
Caste: Kal.l.ar 0.144
⇤⇤
(0.051)
Caste: Na¯yakkar 0.299
(0.168)
Caste: RC Ya¯tavar  0.223⇤⇤⇤
(0.032)
Reputation Terms
Generous: Indirect e↵ect, support given 1.426⇤⇤⇤ 0.959⇤⇤⇤
(0.110) (0.090)
Generous: Indirect e↵ect, support received  1.519⇤⇤⇤  0.891⇤⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.095)
Generous: Direct e↵ect, support given 2.334⇤⇤⇤ 2.562⇤⇤⇤
(0.080) (0.105)
Generous: Direct e↵ect, support received 0.684⇤⇤⇤ 0.638⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.140)
Influential: Indirect e↵ect, support given  0.092 0.123
(0.117) (0.116)
Influential: Indirect e↵ect, support received  0.651⇤⇤⇤  0.596⇤⇤⇤
(0.137) (0.153)
Influential: Direct e↵ect, support given 1.262⇤⇤⇤ 1.096⇤⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.145)
Influential: Direct e↵ect, support received  0.749⇤⇤⇤ 0.070
(0.171) (0.245)
Structural Terms
Reciprocity 1.679⇤⇤⇤ 1.267⇤⇤⇤
(0.077) (0.095)
Shared Partners (GWESP, ↵ = 0.6, 0.5) 0.815⇤⇤⇤ 0.951⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.028)
AIC 25048.556 18701.117
BIC 25371.056 18974.971
Log Likelihood -12492.278 -9322.558
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
Table S11: Summary of ERG models including both influence and generosity terms, for each
village, showing model coe cients with standard errors in parentheses.
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Variable Term type Change Statistic
Edge Intercept The tie adds one edge.
Age Node covariate Both are 42.
Caste Node factor Both are Pal.l.ar.
Gender Node in-factor Both are women.
Household Wealth Node in-covariate Both are from households with property and wealth totaling 100,000 Rs.
Gender Homophily Edge factor They have the same gender.
Close Kin Edge factor They are not related.
Caste Homophily Edge factor They are of the same caste.
Education Years Di↵erence Edge covariate They have equal schooling.
Distance between Households Edge covariate Their houses are 100 meters apart.
Indirect Reputation, Given Node in-factor The e↵ect of a person’s reputation on giving support to others;
varied from 0.1 to 1 in Figure 3, held constant at 0.1 in S4
Indirect Reputation, Received Node out-factor The e↵ect of a person’s reputation on getting support from others;
held constant at 0.1 in Figure 3, varied from 0.1 to 1 in Figure S4
Direct Reputation, Given Edge factor The requester nominates the giver as having the reputational quality. For
panel 1, the change statistic is 0. For panel 2 and above, the change statistic is 1.
Direct Reputation, Received Edge factor The requester is nominated by the giver as having the reputational quality.
For panels 1-4, the change statistic is 0. For panel 5, the change statistic is 1.
Reciprocity Edge factor For panels 1 to 3, the change statistic is 0. For panels 4 and 5, the change
statistic is 1, meaning the tie is reciprocal.
Shared Partners Edge factor For panels 1 and 2, the change statistic is 0. For panels 3 and above,
the change statistic is one, meaning the tie adds one edgewise shared
partnership to the network.
Table S12: Description of the change statistics used to generate predictions for Figure 3 and
SI Figure S4.
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Figure S4: Summary of the e↵ect of the four di↵erent reputational qualities and social proximity
on the probability of a supportive relationship in Al
¯
aka¯puram and Ten
¯
pat.t.i, as the reputation of the
individual requesting support increases. The reputation of the person giving support is held constant
here at 0.1, and we use 42 year-old women of one well-represented caste to illustrate the e↵ect of other
variables. Each panel shows the e↵ect of a person’s increasing reputational standing on the probability
of others requesting support of her, starting with just the indirect e↵ect of reputational standing, and
progressively adding further dimensions to the relationship between the giver and requester, such that
in addition to the variables considered in the panels to the left, in Panel 2 the requester also nominates
the giver as having the reputational quality, in Panel 3 the giver and requester also have a shared
partner, in Panel 4 the requester also provides support to the giver (so, a reciprocal relationship), and
in Panel 5 the giver also nominates the requester as having the reputational quality. See SI Table S12
for further description of the particular change statistics used to calculate the predictions.
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Al
¯
aka¯puram
Coe cient Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Intercept (↵) -2.05 0.09 -2.23 -1.88
Mean individual e↵ect (⌧) 0.37 0.06 0.26 0.48
Influential 0.40 0.26 -0.11 0.93
Education 0.40 0.05 0.30 0.50
Age 0.43 0.25 -0.05 0.93
Age2 -0.28 0.24 -0.77 0.19
Gender (Female = 0) 0.10 0.09 -0.07 0.27
Caste (Scheduled Caste = 1) 0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.27
Wealth 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.11
Ten
¯
pat.t.i
Coe cient Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Intercept (↵) -1.86 0.07 -2.01 -1.72
Mean individual e↵ect (⌧) 0.48 0.06 0.35 0.60
Influential 0.59 0.31 -0.03 1.19
Education 0.42 0.07 0.29 0.55
Age 0.51 0.29 -0.06 1.08
Age2 -0.37 0.28 -0.91 0.17
Gender (Female = 0) -0.12 0.11 -0.34 0.09
Caste (Scheduled Caste = 1) 0.09 0.11 -0.12 0.31
Wealth 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.10
Table S13: Summary of posterior distributions of parameters in binomial regression models
with individual-level random e↵ects, modeling peoples’ number of ties with high position
individuals outside of each village. Where possible, the variables have been centered and
rescaled.
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Figure S5: Scatterplots with LOESS curve (and shaded 95% confidence interval) showing the
relationship between a person’s weighted PageRank centrality in the social support network
(rescaled to range from 0 to 1) and his/her reputation for (top) giving good advice and
(bottom) having good character for residents of the two villages, both in aggregate (a) and
broken out by gender (b).
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